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Abstract 
Germany: facing the Nazi past today  
This article gives an overview of the changing debate on 
National Socialism and the question of guilt in German society. 
Memory had a different meaning in different generations, 
shaping distinct phases of dealing with the past, from silence 
and avoidance to sceptical debate, from painful “Vergangen-
heitsbewältigung” to a general memory of suffering. 
In present-day Germany, memory as collective personal memo-
ry has faded away. At the same time, literature has lost its role 
as a main medium to mass media like cinema and television. 
Furthermore, memory has become fragmented. Large groups of 
members of the German society, like immigrants, see the past 
from a different perspective altogether. Although the remem-
brance of the time of National Socialism is still a distinctive part 
of Germany’s political culture, it has become more generalised, 
with “Holocaust memory” as a globalised symbol for a funda-
mental “break” in Western culture.  
Opsomming 
Geskiedenis, herinnering en die media in na-oorlogse 
Duitsland 
Hierdie artikel gee ’n oorsig oor die veranderende debat oor 
Nasionaal-Sosialisme en die kwessie van ’n skuldgevoel in die 
Duitse gemeenskap. Die skrywer bemerk dat “onthou” verskil-
lende betekenisse vir verskillende generasies gehad het en dat 
dit ’n bepaalde vorm gegee het aan die verwerking van bepaal-
de fases van die verlede, van stilte en vermyding tot skeptiese 
debat, van ’n pynlike aanvaarding van die verlede tot ’n algeme-
ne herinnering aan lyding. 
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In die Duitsland van vandag het onthou as ’n gemeenskaplike, 
persoonlike herinnering verdwyn. Terselfdertyd het literatuur sy 
rol as hoofmedium aan die massamedia van rolprente en die 
televisie afgestaan. Geheue het boonop gefragmenteerd ge-
raak. Groot groepe in die Duitse gemeenskap, byvoorbeeld 
immigrante, beskou die verlede uit totaal verskillende perspek-
tiewe. Alhoewel die herinnering aan die tyd van Nasionaal-
Sosialisme steeds ’n definitiewe deel van die Duitse politieke 
kultuur vorm, het dit veralgemeen geraak, met die “volksmoord-
herinnering” as ’n globale simbool vir ’n fundamentele breuk in 
die Westerse kultuur. 
1. Memory of generations  
Since the end of the Second World War, Germans have been see-
ing the foundation of their identity in their shared historical responsi-
bility for the atrocities of National Socialism and the Holocaust as 
well as for the Second World War. Until recently, personal memories 
of the time of National Socialism or war had still shaped the life of 
every individual member of the society, in most cases either from 
the perspective of the perpetrator, the fellow-traveller, or the bystan-
der, sometimes also from the perspective of the opponent or from 
the resistance.  
Historically, National Socialism was widely seen as having its roots 
in Germany’s flawed process of building a modern nation, its autho-
ritarian and militaristic cultural patterns and educational values – in 
short, in the German Sonderweg (Grebing, 1986). After the war, in a 
new and better Germany, the common effort of all members of the 
society was seen as an effort to learn from the mistakes of the past 
in order to build a better future. Rhetorical phrases like “Never 
again!” could be found in every official political speech.  
In the context of immediate memories, for a long time it seemed un-
thinkable that German armed forces would ever again fight outside 
German territory for example, especially in Eastern Europe. In 1999, 
however, during the Kosovo War in former Yugoslavia, it became 
clear that something had changed. The then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Joschka Fischer, argued that German troops should join 
NATO peacekeeping forces because it was their historical respon-
sibility to prevent “another Auschwitz” (Fried, 2005). Had “the Ger-
mans”, from their own point of view, turned from “perpetrators” into 
“liberators”? And is “another Auschwitz” imaginable, different from 
the historical one? More than 60 years after the end of the Second 
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World War, there seems to be a paradigm shift (Löffler, 2005). A 
new memorial pattern seems to have emerged in Germany.  
Beyond political rhetoric, to the ordinary German, memory of the 
Nazi period and the Second World War was mainly structured by the 
narrative of “generations”. This “cultural pattern of interpretation” of 
collective historical experience has, like in the USA (Howe & 
Strauss, 1991), a long tradition in Germany (Weigel, 2005). Mem-
bers of one generation are shaped by common experiences and 
consequently share a special social knowledge and social habits. 
They hand down their distinctive memories to their children by 
narrating “family stories”. In the next generation, the stories change. 
Sons and daughters share a different view founded in their own, 
different, experiences. Normally, this “communicative memory” has 
outlived its time three generations after a historical event, as there 
are no witnesses left to share their experiences. Society begins to 
deal with memories in a different way. As “cultural memories” they 
become part of the general political culture of a society. This is 
precisely what is presently happening in Germany (Assmann, 2007).  
Few of those who were eyewitnesses to the period of National 
Socialism as adults, or even as children, are still alive. Those, 
whose lives were shaped by the war and the post-war situation, now 
belong to the oldest generation. Their children, the first post-war 
generation, are also growing old. Their narratives are coming to an 
end, in the same way as the narratives of victims, of concentration 
camp survivors or survivors of forced labour or victims of eugenics. 
Nowadays school classes still flock to concentration camps which 
have become memorials, but few survivors are still there to narrate 
their ordeal. “The absence of those witnesses also cuts deeply into 
our own work. They are the most authentic source of information for 
students”, says Horst Seferns, spokesman of the Memorials of 
Sachsenhausen and Ravensbrück (Tsorzis, 2005). 
Usually generational cohorts are seen to be about 30 years apart 
(Mannheim, 1964), but as far as experiences of National Socialism 
and war were concerned, the time span could be much shorter. The 
ruptures between the rule of National Socialism, the “Total War”, 
unconditional surrender of Germany, the dire post-war situation and 
the emerging two new republics were drastic and affected every 
single person in Germany, shaping their lives forever. The last of 
these “war generations” is the older generation of today – those who 
were born during the last phase of the war or shortly thereafter – into 
families and into a society, where National Socialism and war were 
still topical since they were part of an immediate experience of their 
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parents and grandparents. This generation looks back to a life in a 
divided post-war Germany, to the Cold War and the so-called eco-
nomic miracle, to a life in a society that tried to come to terms with 
the horrors of the past. With their children now being at the centre of 
public debate, an overwhelming common experience of dictatorship 
and war no longer exists. Instead, experiences have become frag-
mented.  
1.1 1945: “collective guilt” 
In the Stunde Null (hour zero), namely in 1945, confrontation with 
past horrors was brutal, but clear. When occupying Germany, Ame-
ricans had already done extensive research on the attitude of 
Germans and on cultural and historical traditions in German society 
that may have made National Socialism possible. Against the pro-
test of a number of prominent exiled Germans, their conclusion cul-
minated in the Kollektivschuldthese (thesis of collective guilt). 
Germans as a people were collectively held responsible for what 
had happened, because Germans had, as a people, supported Na-
tional Socialism. The general view was that they had uncritically fol-
lowed their leaders, because as a collective they had an authorita-
rian, militaristic mindset. Although Germans were addressed as a 
collective, in effect the accusation targeted every single individual. In 
the first year after the end of the war, posters depicting piles of dead 
bodies from concentration camps were placed everywhere in de-
stroyed German cities with the caption: “Das ist DEINE Schuld!” 
(“This is YOUR guilt!”). Allied policy involved every single citizen in 
the rather bureaucratic process of “denazification”. The USA felt that 
they were on a moral mission against an “evil” that had gripped a 
whole nation (Agar, 1946).  
Where everybody is accused, in the end, however, nobody takes re-
sponsibility. The strict Allied policy was limited in its immediate effect 
and did not last long. Already in 1947, a shift in the American policy 
took place after the break with Stalin’s Soviet Union and “denazi-
fication” was dropped. A strong post-war Germany was needed in a 
“crusade” against the Soviet Union (Eisenhower, 1948). Neverthe-
less, while Germans had internalised the accusation of “collective 
guilt”, they simultaneously tried to avoid facing it (Assmann & Fre-
vert, 1999). This attitude would become the basic pattern of dealing 
with the Nazi past for a long period to come. In spite of the imme-
diate reaction to insisting on collective innocence and looking for 
psychological mechanisms to relieve this seemingly unbearable 
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moral burden, the question of guilt became part of the self-image of 
the emerging new Germany (Jaspers, 1946).  
1.2 The “silent generation”: literature, art and religion as 
“consolation”  
Immediately after 1945, it was not just the Allies who acted. German 
writers, philosophers and journalists and members of the educated 
middle class also raised their voices in an intense debate (Laurien, 
1992). It dominated the numerous cultural journals published under 
Allied occupation. These journals tried to approach the question of 
guilt in the intellectual categories of the old German educated middle 
classes, the Bildungsbürgertum, trying to restore the values of idea-
listic philosophy and cultural criticism. Germany’s tradition of classi-
cal humanism was emphatically placed against what was seen as 
an onslaught of “barbarism”. The authors were, in general, members 
of the so-called “Inner emigration”, journalists and writers who had 
not left the country, but had survived within Nazi Germany. These 
journals sold like hot cakes, although after the currency reform in 
1948, when other goods were more readily available, it became 
clear that the majority of German readers were actually really 
looking for consolation.  
Consolation could be found in religion, in art and music, and in litera-
ture. For many years to come, literature would be the main medium 
through which the past was confronted – or avoided. In the early 
years, meditative poetry celebrating unspoilt nature as a refuge, and 
novels with Christian undertones provided the consolation and 
guidance many Germans were looking for. It was the same kind of 
classicism that had already dominated German literature of the last 
war years (Schäfer, 1981). Readers were still familiar with the va-
lues of German classical idealism, and Goethe was often seen as 
moral counterpart to the “barbarism” of the Nazis, as became ob-
vious in 1949, when Goethe’s 200th birthday was celebrated (Mei-
necke, 1949).  
Academic research on National Socialism also existed, but was con-
fined within the boundaries of academia and did not reach a wider 
public, perhaps with the exception of Eugen Kogon’s analysis of the 
concentration camps as a perverted rational system (Kogon, 1946). 
Popularised historiography, however, became increasingly en 
vogue. In the early 1950s, memoirs of Nazi officers, air pilots and 
other war heroes were thrown on the book market in high numbers. 
Probably the readership consisted mainly of returned soldiers who 
did not have other categories than “heroism” and “sacrifice” for the 
Germany: facing the Nazi past today 
98 ISSN 0258-2279  Literator 30(3) Des./Dec. 2009:93-113 
“fatherland” to push aside their guilt feelings and traumatic expe-
riences. 
In the West, part of the old elites continued to remain in power in the 
New Federal Republic, although politicians were mainly recruited 
from the older, pre-Nazi generation of the Weimar Republic. Few of 
those who had been forced to exile by Nazi rule returned to West 
Germany (Merz, 1985), and survivors and victims who still lived in 
Germany were few and did rarely raise their voice – and few people 
listened. Public debate in the emerging Federal Republic was mainly 
the debate of those who had experienced National Socialism as 
Nazis, fellow travellers or bystanders – Germans who had resisted 
were often suspiciously looked at. The majority of Germans did not 
really want to hear about the past, but compensated guilt feelings 
and trauma with hard work. When the new Republic was founded, 
the war generation had turned into the Wiederaufbaugeneration 
(generation of reconstruction). The young generation shied away 
from politics but soon laid the foundation, with American assistance, 
to the Wirtschaftswunder (German economic miracle). The term 
silent generation, although originally coined in the United States, re-
ceived its own meaning in Germany. As historian Hermann Lübbe 
observed, there was virtually no public debate on the Nazi past in 
the 1950s (Lübbe, 1983). Rather, the period between 1933 and 
1945 was approached with mystifying terms like “the dark time”, “the 
time of evil”, as if the Nazis had fallen unto the German people like 
some demons from hell and inflicted disaster and chaos (Haug, 
1967). At the same time, German mass media like cinema and TV 
responded to other emotional needs. The so-called Heimatfilm 
became extremely popular, portraying sentimental stories of love 
and faithfulness set in peaceful old-fashioned villages in the Alps. In 
hindsight, the seeming harmlessness of the media culture of the 
1950s and early 1960s is striking, but it is a fake harmlessness, a 
sugary coat on events that were too horrible to be touched. 
1.3 The “sceptical generation”: literature and critical debate 
There were some, however, who refused to be part of this culture of 
silence. Already in 1946 a small group of intellectuals and former 
soldiers calling themselves the “young generation” (although most of 
them were already in their forties), had launched a radical cultural 
journal called Der Ruf. When its editors lost their publishing licence 
because of being too critical towards the Allied military government, 
they gathered journalists and writers around them and in 1947 
founded, the so-called Gruppe 47 (Group 47). Strongly influenced by 
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French existentialism and identifying with the American “lost gene-
ration” of the 1930s, their main idea was that National Socialism had 
destroyed European civilisation and that there was no way back. 
Destruction had reached as deep as the very language that we 
speak. The only way to go forward was to start from “point zero”. 
Kahlschlag (clear cutting) became the keyword. Poetry was no 
longer seen as solemn and consoling whispering of priest-like poets 
– it had to be sober, radical and painful.  
This radical concept was soon challenged as new and less rigid wri-
ters joined the group. Gradually but continuously, the group ex-
panded and became the most influential literary circle in Germany. 
Around 1960, it had the reputation of embracing everybody who was 
an aspiring or already successful writer and intellectual in the 
Federal Republic. It dominated intellectual life in Germany with its 
liberal-leftist leanings. The group, however, never included all poets 
and writers of the time, and as Ernestine Schlant has argued, the 
horrors of the concentration camps were rarely articulated (Schlant, 
1999). 
This is not surprising. Concentration camps and their horrors were 
not part of the immediate memories of the majority of Germans, 
even not of those who saw themselves as members of a radical 
critical left. The concentration camp was generally seen as an 
experience that was beyond imagination, let alone description. Wri-
ters and intellectuals who did experience the unspeakable, like the 
few remaining German-Jewish intellectuals, did not become an 
integral part of Germany’s emerging post-war culture of memory 
(Amery, 1966). Poets like Paul Celan, Rose Ausländer and Nelly 
Sachs may have been highly appreciated in certain circles, but did 
not become part of a wider literary culture. So, who was there to tell 
the story of the past?  
The Gruppe 47 may not have represented everybody in society, but 
it articulated a distinct approach of a “sceptical generation” (Schel-
sky, 1963) towards the past. The group rejected everything sound-
ing like ideology and believed firmly that critical dispute itself could 
lead to a better and more democratic political culture. In this regard, 
the group did contribute to the emergence of a culture of debate in 
post-war Germany. The media also complied: The yearly group 
meetings became the intellectual media event in Germany, and gra-
dually, together with the growing dominance of the leftist-liberal print 
media like Der Spiegel and Die Zeit, a change in the political climate 
of the Republic could be observed. Critical literature written by 
Gruppe 47 members was hotly disputed. Two novels, The tin drum 
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by Grass (1959), a bitter grotesque of the German petite bourgeoisie 
corrupted by National Socialism, and Böll’s Views of a clown (1963), 
a melancholic criticism of the hypocrisy of the Bonn Republic, 
became bestsellers. Both authors later received the Nobel Prize.  
The debate on fiction was soon flanked by more real events. In the 
early 1960s, Eichmann was tried in Jerusalem, with Hannah Arendt 
writing her famous essay in the United States (Arendt, 1963), while 
court cases against Nazi perpetrators also took place in Germany. 
The Auschwitz-Prozess in Frankfurt was documented and reflected 
by writers like Peter Weiss and Alexander Kluge. It is no coincidence 
that both did not use their imagination, but tried to speak about the 
unspeakable by merely arranging court proceedings and docu-
ments. Still, there was the widespread feeling that there was no lan-
guage ever that could express “Auschwitz”. 
1.4 The generation of “1968”: rational analysis and emotions  
This all was only a prelude to a deeply rooted shift in German post-
war society. In 1967, a new generation of intellectuals invaded a 
meeting of Gruppe 47 and declared that the time for literature had 
run out; the time had come for direct political confrontation. The 
rebellion at German universities, strongly influenced by the Ame-
rican protest against the Vietnam war, soon focused on one main 
topic: How to deal with the Nazi past. The youngest generation, the 
“children of the war” and those born immediately after the war, were 
now adults and no longer ready to accept their parents’ silence 
(Gassert, 2006). This was the first generation which had not 
experienced the Nazi period itself, and also had only faint memories 
of the war and the post-war years. They saw themselves as en-
lightened rationalists; literature was no longer their medium of ex-
pression. Rather, it was intellectual analysis and social psychology. 
They were motivated by books like The fatherless society and The 
inability to mourn written by social psychologists Alexander and 
Margarete Mitscherlich (1967) or by the socio-psychological anal-
yses put forward by Adorno (1950) or Reich (1971).  
The heritage they left is one of moral rigidity and a firm belief in the 
power of critical rational analysis. Academic books on social and 
historical analyses of National Socialism now flooded the book 
market. There was a strong confidence in enlightenment by reason: 
if the Nazi past was approached with the right analytical instruments 
and critical terms, then one day it would be possible to fully explain 
what happened and why, and explanation would lead to under-
standing. Learning to understand – as a painful and troublesome 
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process – would protect Germans from repeating the past. The 
German term Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the 
past) reflects this thinking: through hard work and self reflection, as 
in psychoanalytical therapy, the preoccupation with the past could 
be “overcome”, and then the way into the future would be free. The 
typical representative of the 68er generation was not a writer, but an 
academic or a teacher, perhaps a journalist or a politician. He/she 
tried to substitute the immediate experience which was no longer 
accessible by analysis.  
In the 1970s German society was deeply divided along generational 
lines. Government had changed from conservative dominance to a 
charismatic Social Democratic chancellor. Willy Brandt, who himself 
had been exiled as a resistance fighter against National Socialism, 
fell onto his knees at the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial in 1970, a 
symbolic gesture that set the tone for the whole younger generation. 
They had finally forced their parents to talk; and when they left the 
universities, they carried the debate into society. Many of them be-
came teachers, and pupils were now exposed to a curriculum where 
National Socialism featured prominently. Sometimes it even became 
too much. “Between standard 3 and standard 10”, wrote author Flo-
rian Illies (born in 1971),  
we had National Socialism at least eight times on our schedule, 
(…) saw the films about the horrors of the concentration camps, 
Hitler’s demagogic speeches, the Eastern Front and the liber-
ation in 1945 about eighteen times, not only in History, but also 
in Religion and German (Illies, 2000:174).  
German academic historians now also came to the fore. Many of 
them had left the conservative nationalism of their discipline behind. 
Now they saw historiography as a strict analytical social science. All 
emotional and moral elements should be eliminated from research in 
order to go beyond mystification and provide a reliable and sober 
structural and functional analysis. This was, in their view, the only 
way to explain the social and economic factors that had led to the 
system of National Socialism, and only a clear rational understand-
ing of the underlying structures could prevent repetition. While pain-
ful and guilt-loaded memories had to be respected, they could only 
distort analysis. There were, however, others, mainly Jewish histo-
rians who insisted on the memory of pain and humiliation as the 
basis of their work. A controversy between Martin Broszat, the then 
director of the Institute for Contemporary History, and the Jewish 
historian Saul Friedländer focused on this question. Broszat claimed 
that Friedländer mixes experience and analysis in his research, thus 
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shaping a new myth rather than presenting a sober approach to his-
torical and social reality, while Friedländer, on his part, claimed that 
historical analysis cannot exist without the dimension of morality and 
memory (Broszat & Friedländer, 1988). Thus historiography and me-
mory clashed.  
It is interesting to note that literature remained an important aspect 
of public debate. Some members of the 1968 generation carried the 
confrontation with the parent generation from the family table into 
literature. A new genre, the so-called Väter-Literatur, emerged 
(Vogt, 1998). Others, however, broke away altogether to embrace 
an extreme moral rigidity that ended in the left-wing terrorism of the 
Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) with the result that the republic was 
shaken by a nightmarish phase of terror and hate on the one hand 
and harsh reactions, perhaps over-reactions on the other hand 
within a democratic state that was not yet sure of its stability (Wirth, 
2001).  
As in schools and academia, it became clear in the public domain as 
well that in all attempts to deal with the past analytically, something 
was missing. In 1979, the American series Holocaust was broad-
casted in Germany, finally providing an opportunity for all Germans 
to identify emotionally with the victims and their odyssey through 
Nazi concentration camps (Märtesheimer & Frenzel, 1979; Marko-
vits & Hayden, 1980). Different from literature, the media did not shy 
away from visualising the unspeakable (Friedländer, 1992). Intellec-
tuals may have dismissed this series as sentimental, but it gave a 
face to the victims, and it showed emotions as a legitimate means to 
deal with the past. Until then, Germans had no way to express their 
often conflicting and diffused emotions of guilt and shame on the 
one hand and their traumatic memories of war, bombardments and 
the loss of loved ones on the other hand. These emotions had sim-
ply never been part of public debate, as the accusation of guilt and 
the attempt to avoid facing it were still too powerful. Now that 
viewers of the Holocaust series could identify with victims, other 
emotions were allowed to emerge to the surface as well. 
1.5 The 1980s: “normalisation”? 
After the demise of left-wing terrorism, the atmosphere in German 
society changed again. In the first economic crisis after the war and 
because of the oil crisis, Germans feared the loss of affluence and 
stability that had been achieved, which of course they were keen to 
keep. From the early 1980s, German society experienced a con-
servative backlash. Normalisation was the keyword since there was 
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a widespread feeling that an end should be put to all these debates 
on the past.  
After 1982 chancellor Helmut Kohl, a conservative and a historian by 
training, tried to bring the discussion on guilt and redemption to an 
end. Born in 1930, he saw himself as the first representative of a 
generation that no longer had to bear the burden of collective guilt 
personally. His phrase of “Gnade der späten Geburt”, the “grace” or 
“benign fate” of having been born too late to be made responsible 
for National Socialism (Koepke, 2004), became controversial, as 
was his attempt to “historicise” National Socialism. Some intellec-
tuals agreed and began to comment critically on what they per-
ceived as a concession towards a culture of left-liberal “political cor-
rectness” (Walser, 1998). Kohl himself had a somewhat clumsy way 
to deal with what he believed to be political symbolism: When US 
president Reagan visited Germany in 1985, Kohl arranged for a 
symbolic meeting of the two leaders at a war cemetery in Bitburg to 
shake hands over the graves of American as well as of German 
World War II soldiers. This symbolic gesture proved to be embar-
rassing in that some of the German soldiers buried in Bitburg were 
actually members of the SS, Hitler’s ruthless elite corps that was in 
charge of the concentration camps – even if not all of its members 
might have been involved in the administration of KZs in person. 
Was reconciliation over the graves of members of this terror 
organisation really possible? (Hallet, 2005).  
The then president of the Republic, Richard von Weizsäcker, was 
more successful in dealing with symbolism when in the same year in 
his speech commemorating the end of the war he made it very clear 
that 1945 had not been the year of the “defeat” of Germany, but of 
the “liberation” from the most horrible dictatorship in memory. With 
this, he placed the Federal Republic in the tradition of the “other” 
Germany, that is a Germany that had suffered under National So-
cialism (Weizsäcker, 1985). A year later, in 1986, academic histo-
rians fought bitterly over the question if “Auschwitz” was unique in 
history or comparable to other events such as the horrors of Stalin’s 
Gulag, as the conservative historian Ernst Nolte had suggested. For 
historians the answer was basically clear: there can be nothing out-
side history unless something like a metaphysical sphere is acknow-
ledged, and nobody wanted to go back to the metaphorical language 
of the Nazis as demons of evil that came upon the German people 
after 1933. However, to compare horrors with each other still 
seemed to be out of place (Augstein & Bracher, 1987).  
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Three years later, on 9 November 1989, the Berlin wall fell. Not only 
communist East Germany, but consequently, also the old West 
German state ceased to exist, even though West German insti-
tutions remained intact, while East German institutions disappeared. 
Thereby the post-war era came to an end. The new united “Berlin 
Republic” now had its own immediate past – divided post-war Ger-
many. Slowly, the focus of public debate shifted. Memory now con-
centrated on the question if debates of the past had been satis-
factory, instead of debating the Nazi past itself. Germans, like other 
Europeans, tended to identify with the victims now and saw them-
selves on the side of those who had to be liberated from the Nazis. 
The Sonderweg had come to an end, but as the philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas observed “Auschwitz” had become the signature of a 
whole era, of post-war Germany (Habermas, 1987). 
In the Soviet zone and later in the East German state, the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), the regime had had a different ap-
proach to the guilt question than the Western allies. They had 
declared the new society in total to be the heir of the “other Ger-
many”, the Germany of resistance against the Nazi regime, with 
communist resistance fighters as their main heroes. Consequently, 
in the new state that came about in 1949 and claimed to represent a 
new historical stage on its way to a communist society, the question 
of individual guilt simply did not occur. Although it soon became 
obvious that this was an ideological fabrication, this position 
remained official GDR state ideology until the fall of the wall in 1989.  
East German writers from the GDR, however, had turned their 
attention to the Nazi past in the same way as their Western German 
counterparts, but the debate had a somewhat broader foundation. A 
number of resistance writers (including Bertolt Brecht) had returned 
from exile and made East Germany their home, giving their distinct 
perspective, while Jewish writers like Jurek Becker wrote from the 
perspective of a victim. Their books, of course, had also been widely 
read in the West.  
Consequently, after unification it seemed at first as if the debate on 
National Socialism would intensify again in the medium of literature 
(Garbe, 2002), but as time went by, a shift in public attention could 
not be overlooked. Literature now only reached a much smaller 
circle of interested intellectuals than some decades ago; in public 
debate National Socialism simply did not matter anymore as it had 
long been overtaken by the media and popular culture, made in 
Hollywood. With Kassovitz’ Jacob the liar (1999, based on a novel 
by Jurek Becker) and mainly Steven Spielbergs Schindler’s list 
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(1993), it became clear that the Holocaust had become a topic of 
international media events. Inviting identification with the victims, it 
expanded the “question of guilt” from a German problem into a 
general debate on morals and responsibility. Now, anybody could 
identify with Schindler (Levy & Sznaider, 2000:173), and with him a 
new character appeared on the Hollywood screen: the “good 
German” (The good German, 2007; Valkyrie, 2009).  
2. From the question of guilt to the memory of suffering 
This development, however, did not take the burden of guilt away 
from the Germans. In 1996, the American historian David Gold-
hagen returned to the post-war Kollektivschuldthese and the con-
struct of the “bad German” in his book Hitler’s willing executioners 
(Finkelstein & Birn, 1998; Ely, 2000). During his reading tour in 
Germany, he attracted large crowds, as did the exhibition entitled 
Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, on the war of anni-
hilation and the crimes of the German Wehrmacht organised by the 
Hamburg Institute for Social Research. It was first shown in 1994 
and then, after a controversial debate (Hamburger Institut für Sozial-
forschung, 1999) in a different version, in 2004. From the point of 
view of an historian, neither would lead to really new insights. His-
torians had already repeatedly published the facts, and in academic 
debates the role of the Wehrmacht in the atrocities of World War II 
was well known, but only in academia. Memory politics is something 
different, and only now the emotional implications of guilt seemed to 
trickle through to the kitchen table (Steinbacher & Frei, 2001).  
It is true that in the 1990s, some new and interesting literary works 
dealing with the Nazi past were published and discussed. Some of 
them perhaps were more popular abroad than in Germany, as for 
example Bernhard Schlink’s novel Der Vorleser (The reader) of 
1995, which was recommended in Oprah Winfrey’s book club and 
was recently turned into an Oscar-winning Hollywood film (The rea-
der, 2009). Some literary works were authored by German writers of 
the older generation, like Sebald’s (1997) works, or the autobiogra-
phical novels by the two “grand old men of literature” Grass and 
Walser. Some authors of the “68er generation” were still successful 
with books about portraying National Socialism as family history, like 
Timm (2003), Bruns (2004) and Delius (2006). Biographies such as 
the one on the architect of the Holocaust, Heinrich Himmler (Longe-
rich, 2008), tried to connect the emotional element, a life, to the by 
now well researched structural system.  
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Around the turn of the century, the literary debate was fading out. 
Even the publication of Grass’ autobiography (2006), in which he 
admitted that for a short period he had been, at the age of fifteen 
and in the last phase of the war, a member of the SS, had only a 
relatively faint echo in the German public. There was some due 
indignation, but not as much as there would have been some twenty 
years before. In general, the end of the narrative of generations and 
the end of public debates in the medium of literature coincided. 
Younger writers were beginning to take over the German book 
market with no obvious interest in the Nazi past as the dialogue of 
generations, and concentrated, with exceptions (Hacker, 2003), on 
other issues. It was also the end of Vergangenheitsbewältigung in 
the social-psychological sense (Trommler, 2003). Now the argument 
changed: while it had been stressed before that hard work and 
painful self-exploration were necessary to “overcome” guilt feelings 
and shame, the focus was now put on the need to remember the 
past. The “Never again!” became an “Always remember!” Only re-
membrance could prevent a society to fall back into the “break of 
civilization” (Uhl, 2003) for which the Holocaust as symbol now 
became ubiquitous. 
2.1 Loosening of taboos  
The focus on memory of suffering in general instead of on special 
responsibility and guilt of the German people made it possible to 
loosen the taboo that still overshadowed the memories of most Ger-
mans. Now, it became finally possible to talk about war and destruc-
tion, of bombardments and mass rape, of the forced migration of 
thousands of ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe 
immediately after the war, and other traumatic experiences on the 
side of the Germans. It started, for one more time, with literature, but 
the German mass media soon took over. In 1997 Sebald, clearly 
influenced by a debate in Britain, caused a heated controversy by 
his claim that the horrors of the bombardment of German cities had 
not been sufficiently dealt with in literature; one year later, Grass 
broke the ice with Im Krebsgang (2002), based on the sinking of the 
ship “Wilhelm Gustloff” by Soviet warships in the Baltic sea. It had 
caused the death of about ten thousand German refugees in the last 
phase of the war. The book market was quick to introduce some 
best-selling, but controversial book on the bombardments (Friedrich, 
2002), and public TV broadcasted a soap called Dresden where, 
among the horrors of the bombardment of the city by British air-
crafts, a young attractive German woman saves the live of a British 
bomber pilot. Of course, she falls in love with him, carrying his child 
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when the war ends, into a future of political correctness. The 
problem of mass rape of German women by Soviet soldiers has also 
recently been turned into a film (Eine Frau in Berlin, 2008) based on 
an autobiographic narrative. The German film Der Untergang (The 
Downfall, 2006) belongs in this category too, showing the frenzy and 
obsession of the inner core of Nazi followers around an increasingly 
insane Hitler in his bunker during the final bombardment of Berlin. 
The character of public debate itself is thus changing. In the media, 
news and “infotainment” clips flash up and disappear; arguments 
have a tendency to shrink to slogans and analytical terms to mere 
symbols. History can be a media event that offers identification and 
identity, rather than analysis and reflection. By the turn of the 
millennium, literature had lost the leading role that it used to play in 
public debate, while academic historians do not reach out far 
enough in a society which is largely dominated by popular media 
culture.  
Furthermore, in a society where concrete experiences and memo-
ries of individuals become more and more remote and diversified, 
the concept of generation can no longer serve as a valuable cultural 
pattern of interpretation. Equally, memory becomes more abstract, 
as it needs special memorial spaces and public representations 
(Assmann, 2007). When Berlin was re-invented as the old-new 
German metropolis, it was also seen as a space of remembrance, 
an Erinnerungsort (Schulze & Francois, 2001). With the reconstruc-
tion of Berlin, the debate on history, memory, and policy shifted to 
architecture, and the most controversial of numerous debates was 
the one on the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin, which now sticks out 
like a sore thumb with its dark grey concrete slabs between the his-
torical and posh modern buildings of Berlin city centre (Stavginski, 
2002; Kirsch, 2003).  
2.2 Diversified memories 
Whatever the result of these debates may be, memory in Germany 
has changed forever. The widening of the perspective also means 
that in Germany, too, we have to deal now with divided, even com-
peting memories (Diner, 2007). Today, memory is not just about vic-
tims and perpetrators. The paradigm shift that Germany presently 
experiences is also a result of the changing cultural and geogra-
phical roots of Germans today. According to official statistics, today 
almost 20% of all people living in Germany have a migration 
background. In some of the large cities in Germany’s Western parts, 
the number of inhabitants with migration background is as high as 
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30% and 40%; in the foreseeable future half of the inhabitants of 
Berlin, Frankfurt or Stuttgart will have parents or grandparents who 
were not born in Germany. This has far-reaching consequences, 
also for cultural memory. In one of five German families, there are 
no grandparents or other relatives who experienced the Nazi time 
and the war in Germany except perhaps they experienced it in 
occupied territories during World War II. Family stories at the kitchen 
table have different tales to tell. No longer is it possible to lead 
school classes to concentration camp memorials and explain to 
them that this was the responsibility of their own parents or grand-
parents, and that therefore, they, as Germans, are shouldering a 
special responsibility too. Students whose families immigrated from 
Turkey, Russia, the former Yugoslavia, Greece or Italy identify in 
different ways. Recently, the Memorial of the Wannsee Conference 
ran a special programme for young people of Arabic origin living in 
Berlin-Neukölln. They emphatically identified with Palestine and did 
not feel sympathy for the Jews in which they could only see Israel.  
In German society, there is no longer a common collective memory, 
telling Germans where they came from and consequently, where 
they are heading. The old founding myth of a democratic nation, 
rising from the ruins of the most horrifying systematic mass exter-
mination in human remembrance, and a nation struggling with guilt 
and responsibility, has to be negotiated and diversified. It will have 
to include other memories. Civil war refugees from within and 
outside Europe live in Germany today. They also have their stories 
to tell, and they have their contribution to make. The keyword de-
scribing German society has increasingly become “diversity”, and 
the main question to be asked is: Which memories will, in future, 
bind society together? The memory of National Socialism will, how-
ever, always be there. Its presence in the media is rather increasing 
than decreasing. It is a sting in the flesh that cannot simply be 
pushed aside – not in Germany and not elsewhere in the world. 
3. The future: Holocaust as a globalised icon? 
Although prominently situated in Germany’s capital, the Holocaust 
Memorial does no longer provide a purely German memorial space, 
but is part of a larger memorial culture. With the centre of the debate 
shifting to the United States, “Holocaust memory” has been globa-
lised (Mintz, 2001). The time for a special German cultural memory 
seems to have run out. The debate has shifted from “Auschwitz” as 
a historical event to “Holocaust” as a moral category, as an icon of 
memory worldwide (Weiss, 2002). 
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In the new millennium, “Holocaust” is no longer seen as a Jewish 
catastrophe with German perpetrators, but as a universal break of 
Western civilisation. Worldwide, groups of victims set their own 
suffering in analogy to the Holocaust, thus confirming its uniqueness 
in comparing it. The attitude towards the Kosovo conflict was a 
decisive step in this direction, as Germany this time saw itself on the 
side of the “liberators” (Levy & Sznaider, 2000:194 ff.). This gamma-
tion of the local and the global, of universalism and particularism 
seems to be typical for what the sociologist Ulrich Beck calls “se-
cond modernity” (Beck, 1986), or as others put it, “postmodernity”. 
“Auschwitz” and “Holocaust” are now seen as transnational memory 
spaces, as isolated icons or metaphors without a concrete historical 
context. Memory becomes, as Levy and Sznaider put it, “fluid” as 
“cosmopolitan memory” (Levy & Sznaider, 2000). “Holocaust” is thus 
seen as a problem of identity rather than as a concrete historical 
memory (MacDonald, 2008).  
Some see this as a thoroughly positive development. In a time of 
“delocalisation” of politics and culture, they claim, “Holocaust” as a 
memory icon will be able to provide a new foundation for the diffe-
rentiation between “good” and “evil” in general (Levy & Sznaider, 
2000:15). The difference between “good victims” and “bad perpe-
trators” becomes as universal as the definition of the “bystander” 
and the “hero” who, in the name of the “good victims” is able to fight 
against the “bad perpetrators”. The necessity of reconciliation – after 
the “good” order has been restored – between the collectives of the 
victims and the collectives of the perpetrators could provide the 
basis for new global regimes (Levy & Sznaider, 2000:160). But the 
division of the world into “the good” and “the bad” is perhaps too 
simple to provide the basis of a new world order. It is no coincidence 
that Levy and Sznaider welcome the fact that the mass media, 
especially Hollywood, now transport the main patterns of identifi-
cation: “In a World that is increasingly individualized, memory can 
only be transported by mass communication, because only mass 
communication can overcome the narrow boundaries of states” 
(Levy & Sznaider, 2001:160). It has to be added that only the simple 
icons and messages of mass communication can reach individuals 
in a globalised, albeit diversified world. 
Critics dismiss this concept as an ideology that legitimises Western 
hegemony, with the United States as the “good hero” acting in the 
name of the victims against an “axis of evil”. Traverso (2007) agues 
that today, the new danger does not lie in oblivion, but in a tendency 
to neutralise the critical potential of the Holocaust by generalising 
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and thus misusing it. Western memory politics, he argues, has the 
tendency to use the Holocaust as a “kind of secular theodizee”, as 
an almost sacred topos of memory. Convinced that rationality and 
enlightenment have outlived their time, it establishes “Holocaust 
memory” as a quasi-religion, as the absolute evil in order to con-
vince the world that the Western system is the absolute good 
(Traverso, 2007:71). Diner remarks that “Holocaust” as a metaphor 
for “evil” could only be truly globalised if non-Western societies, for 
example Islamic societies, can also understand it as the paradig-
matic “break of civilisation” (Diner, 2007:104 ff.). He sees the Holo-
caust as far from becoming a global metaphor, because if the West 
talks of the suffering of the Jews, it cannot be silent about colo-
nialism and slavery.  
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